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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of the 2003 Illinois gaming tax increase on gaming
demand. To model gaming demand, slot machine coin-in is chosen for the period January
2000 to December 2006. Multiple regression analysis is used to model both the tax
increase and account for seasonality in the data. A Box Jenkins model was employed
to address correlation of error terms. The findings reveal that Illinois experienced a
decrease in gaming demand when the tax increases took effect. The findings indicate
that legislators should acknowledge and evaluate the negative economic pressures tax
increases have on the gaming industry.
Keywords: gaming tax, gaming tax increase, Illinois gaming tax, riverboat gaming,
gaming demand
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The effects of changes in gaming taxes are widely debated among the various
stakeholders of commercial gaming. The commercial gaming industry and its proponents
accept the general incidence of gaming taxes in part as an acceptable cost of doing
business in an industry that in many cases is difficult if not impossible to enter. The
restricted access to operate legal commercial gaming is partially due to the restricted
nature of licensure. The variance in the degree of difficulty a potential commercial
gaming entity faces depends largely on state and local laws.
The Midwestern United States commercial gaming market has experienced two
trends since it opened in the early nineties: states have consistently deregulated and
increased the rate of gaming taxes. Deregulation has been implemented to better
position operators to compete for local and interstate gaming business. The second
trend has been the consistent increase in the various states' percentage draw from
gaming revenues. These monies are paid in the form of gaming taxes and have often
occurred in conjunction with deregulation. In the case of the Midwestern riverboat
states, state governments have deregulated the industry by removing restrictions such as
the requirement that riverboats actually leave a docksite, the removal or the increase of
betting or loss limits, and the increase of allowable riverboat gaming square footage.
The purpose of this research is to quantify the effect of one of these gaming tax
increases on gaming demand/wagering volume which in this study is represented by
coin-in. Coin-in is a gaming term describing the total amount of monies inserted into
a slot machine. Coin-in and the term "handle" are interchangeable terms used both
in the gaming literature and by the state commissions that report gaming volumes.
Recent literature almost exclusively has adopted the use of coin-in as the descriptor
of gaming demand or wagering volume. In contrast, table drop, a term occasionally
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used by researchers to represent gaming volume, only describes the amount a player
purchases at a table and not the amount wagered (Kilby, Fox, & Lucas, 2004 ). It is
entirely conceivable a casino patron could purchase a million dollars in chips and put
none of them at risk. Coin-in by contrast represents actual monies wagered and therefore,
functions as a more accurate representation of demand (Eisendrath, Bernhard, Lucas, &
Murphy, 2008).
Illinois riverboats saw their highest tier gaming tax rate reach 70 percent on July 1,
2003. The rate had grown steadily from the original flat rate of 20 percent of adjusted
gross revenue that the Illinois legislature had deemed suitable when commercial gaming
was initially introduced in 1991 (Illinois Gaming Board, 2005). The outcry from
commercial gaming and its benefactors to both this particular increase and the general
trend of inflating gaming taxes was considerable. Christensen (2005) warns that gaming
taxes that rise above the 20 percent threshold begin to sway the industry from a focus
on economic development, related job creation, and capital investment. Christensen also
cautions that rates that climb above the 35 percent level prohibit economic viability of
riverboat or racino operations in all but the most significantly undersupplied markets such
as the Chicago area in Illinois (Christiansen, 2005).
Journalists Jamie Mckee and Marc Falcone predict that Illinois' attempt to capture
increased revenues by increasing gaming taxes would have the opposite effect. The tax
increase trend had already restricted operators' innovations and additions that had been
previously planned to maintain competitiveness with operators in surrounding states
like Indiana, Missouri, and Iowa (McKee, 2003). Falcone, who is also a gaming analyst
with Deutsche Bank, foretells that the three boats in the Illinois marketplace that had the
potential to hit the 70 percent gaming tax threshold would actively attempt to manage
their operations to reduce revenues (Falcone, 2003). He also foretells that all operators
will engage in layoffs, restrict comps, rely on fewer table games, and close ancillary
facilities such as restaurants and hotels (Falcone, 2003b).lt is noteworthy to mention that
if Falcone is correct in his prediction, the gaming tax scenario provides gaming managers
a motivation contrary to the universal capitalist goal of maximizing profits.
In an effort to examine the impact of the 2003 tax restructuring this paper is
organized in the following manner. The next section will provide some perspective by
giving a brief overview of gaming taxes in general as well as gaming taxes specific to
Illinois. This will be followed by a review of existing literature on implementation of
other similar tax increases on various industries including hospitality. The literature
review will also address the content, related research, and the particular methodologies
chosen by various researchers to analyze data with similarities to the data reflecting the
Illinois gaming tax increase. The next section will discuss the data and methodology
appropriate to analyze the changes in gaming demand related to the gaming tax changes.
This is followed by the results and conclusions and implications of the study.

Background on gaming in lllinois and the Midwestern United States
In February 1990, Illinois became the second U.S. state to legalize riverboat
gambling when the Riverboat Gambling Act was enacted. Neighboring state Iowa
preceded Illinois when legalizing riverboat gambling in July of 1989 (American Gaming
Association, 2006). Illinois' legislation authorized the Illinois Gaming Board to license
up to ten casino operators. The first riverboat, in Alton, opened September 11, 1991. The
communities of Alton, Aurora, East Dubuque, East St. Louis, Elgin, Joliet, Metropolis,
Peoria, and Rock Island were all granted licenses by 1996 (Illinois Gaming Board, 2005).
Midwest Riverboat Gaming
Illinois and the three commercial gaming states on its border, Iowa, Indiana, and
Missouri, have all followed the "New Jersey" model to the extent that they are limited by
both number of facilities and location (The national gambling impact study commission
final report, 1999). The "New Jersey" model is characterized by the use of gambling for
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the purpose of directing economic development to a restricted number of communities,
in this case along particular waterways. The "New Jersey" model tends to base decisions
on the potential negatives and actively differentiates the gaming industry from other
industry, justifying a more encompassing role for government. This model utilizes
commercial gaming to create enterprise zones which contribute benefits; such as, capital
investment, public sector revenue, jobs and increased tourism to a predetermined number
of locations. This approach to legal commercial gaming lends itself to relatively stricter
controls on the industry.
The state of Illinois authorizes each licensed riverboat gambling operation to offer
up to 1,200 gaming positions. These positions may be a combination of table games
and electronic devices. The Riverboat Gambling Act was amended in 1999 to allow
riverboats to be permanently moored at docksites, thus ending the requirement that
operators must conduct cruises on waterways. The Gambling Act further requires that
patrons of gambling areas of the boats be 21 years of age. Wagering in the casinos must
be conducted by cashless means, including; chips, tokens or vouchers.
Gaming taxes generally fall into three main categories: wagering taxes, fees, and/
or admissions taxes. Wagering taxes are collected by all U.S. states that host commercial
casinos (American Gaming Association, 2006). Despite some minute differences in how
particular states define the tax base, all states use some form of gross gambling receipts
minus payouts, or adjusted gross receipts (AGR) (Anderson, 2005).
Fees are an additional source of revenue for many commercial gaming states.
Riverboat states often charge a licensing fee, which in the case of Iowa is assessed based
on capacity. In contrast, Mississippi assesses their state's licensing fee as a percentage
of AGR (Anderson, 2005). Admission taxes are the third source of revenue for both
states and local government units, and are typical in riverboat states. In these states,
each gambler is required to pay a fee when entering or boarding the facility (Anderson,
2005). Admission taxes range from a set dollar amount to a graduated tax assessment. For
example, some states vary the charge with respect to size of facility or past visitor volume
(American Gaming Association, 2006). Table 1 illustrates the changes to Gaming taxation
in Illinois and its neighbor state Indiana from years 2000 to 2005.
Table 1. A comparison of 2000-2005 Illinois and Indiana riverboat tax rates.
State
IL

IN

2000
Graduated
Tax Rate
from 20%
to 35% of
gross
gaming
revenue,
$2 per
patron
admission
tax
20% tax
on gross
gaming
revenue

2001
Graduated
Tax Rate
from 15%
to 35% of
gross
gaming
revenue,
$2 per
patron
admission
tax
20% tax
rate on
gross
gaming
revenue,
$3 per
patron
admission
tax

2002
Graduated Tax
Rate from 15%
to
50%(Maximum
tax rate through
June 200235%) of gross
gaming
revenue,
$3 per patron
admission tax
Graduated tax
rate from 15%
to35%
(Maximum tax
rate through
June 200220%) of gross
gaming
revenue,
$3 per patron
admission tax

2003
Graduated
Tax Rate
from 15%
to 70% of
gross
gaming
revenue,
$3-$5 per
patron
admission
tax
Graduated
tax rate
from 15%
to 35% of
gross
gaming
revenue,
$3 per
patron
admission
tax

2004
Graduated
Tax Rate
from 15%
to 70% of
gross
gaming
revenue,
$3-$5 per
patron
admission
tax
Graduated
tax rate
from 15%
to 35% of
gross
gaming
revenue,
$3 per
patron
admission
tax

2005
Graduated
Tax Rate
from 15%
to 50% of
gross
gaming
revenue,
$2-$3 per
patron
admission
tax
Graduated
Tax Rate
ofl5% to
35%of
gross
gaming
revenue,
$3 per
patron
admission
tax

Note: Gaming Taxation Rates were retrieved from American Gaming Association State
of the States 2000-2006. Retrieved April12, 2007 from
http://www.americangaming.org/survey/index.cfrn
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It is significant to note that all gaming taxes illustrated in Table 1 are in addition
to and not in lieu of regular business income and real estate
taxes. Gaming taxes are often characterized as being paid for the
Gaming taxes
privilege of operating gaming facilities (Christiansen, 2005).

I

are often
characterized as being paid for
the privilege of operating gaming
facilities.

Illinois Gaming Tax Rates
By means of the Riverboat Gambling Act, the State of
Illinois assesses taxes on riverboat gambling operations by both
an admission tax and a wagering tax. Table 2 illustrates in greater
detail the changes in the graduated gaming taxes in Illinois from July 2001 to July 2005.
Table 2. Detailed Overview of Illinois Gaming Tax Rates.
Panel A
15%up
to $25
Million

July I, 2002- June 30, 2003 Adjusted Gross Revenue Tax Rates
22.5%
27.5%
32.5%
37.5%
45% over 50% over
over $100 $150
over $75
over $25
over $50
$200
Million up Million up Million up Million up Million up Million
to $75
to $100
to $150
to $200
to $50
Million
Million
Million
Million
Million

Pane!B
15%up
to $25
Million

July I, 2003
27.5%
over $25
Million up
to $37.5
Million

-June 30, 2005 Adjusted Gross Revenue Tax Rates
32.5%
37.5%
45% over 50% over 70% over
$75
$100
$200
over $37.5 over $50
Million up Million up Million up Million up Million
to $50
to $75
to $100
to $200
Million
Million
Million
Million

Notes. Admission tax rate: $3, $4 or $5 Per Admission-Dependent upon previous
calendar year admission total (Less than 1 million= $3, 1 million to 2.3 million= $4,
greater than 2.3 million = $5) Local share = $1, All over $1 = State share
AGR Tax: Progressive Tax Rate (indicated above) on calendar YTD AGR level (Gross
Gaming Receipts minus Patron Win) Local Share = 5% of AGR at all levels, State Share
=remainder of progressive percentage. Common School Fund receives the increased
AGR Taxes (increase of 7/112003 AGR Rates over 7/112002 rates).
The new rates were applied to the calendar YTD AGR levels on the July 1, 2003 game
date.
Panel C
Jul 1, 2005 Ad.usted Gross Revenue Tax Rates
22.5%
27.5%
32.5%
37.5%
45% over
over $75
over $100 $150 up to
over $25
over $50
up to $50
up to $75
up to $100 upto$150 $200
Million
Million
Million
Million
Million
Note. Information retrieved from Illinois Gaming Board annual report 2005.
March 10,2007 from http://www.igb.state.il.us/annualreport/
15%up
to $25
Million

50% over
$200
Million
Retrieved

The initial tax increase outlined in the previous table that was approved by the
Illinois Legislature on June 3, 2002, had a profound negative impact on the gaming
market. The evidence of this is provided by the decline in gaming stocks as illustrated
in Table 3. For comparison purposes, it should be noted that the Dow Jones Industrial
Average declined by 2.2 percent on that date.
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Table 3. Performance of selected gaming company stocks for June 3, 2002.
Comoanv
Percentage change in closing price from May 31, to June 3, 2002*
Mandalay Resort Group
-6.4%
Harrah's Entertainment

-7.7%

Boyd Gaming

-14.4%

Hollywood Casinos

-20%

Note: Prices are reported from the Michael Pollock's Gaming Industry Observer in the
report, Examining impacts on Atlantic City of proposed tax increases, VL T competition,
Report retrieved from the files of the American Gaming Association, 1299 Pennsylvania
Ave., NW Suite 1175, Washington, D.C. 2004.
*May 31, 2002 was a Friday and June 3, 2002 was the following Monday. Therefore the
percentage change represents a one day change to the value of the stocks presented.

The enactment of the gaming tax had other effects as well. MGM Mirage, who
did not have any gaming interest in lllinois, withdrew a bid of $615 million to acquire
a casino license in a Chicago suburb. A conference call from Harrah's management to
investors revealed the cancellation of plans to build a $40 million hotel to enhance the
Metropolis riverboat. MGM Mirage released a statement announcing their intention to
focus their efforts on jurisdictions that provide a "stable and reasonable tax environment"
(Pollock, Morowitz, & Gushin).

Literature Review
In an attempt to draw parallels to other situations that mirror the increase in gaming
taxes in lllinois, research that addresses hotel occupancy taxes rates and the federall986
Tax Reform Act on Real Estate proves instructive. Comparisons to the Tax Reform Act
and changes in hotel occupancy tax rates are valid because changes in tax laws ultimately
translate into changes in human behavior. Whether the tax is federal, state or local does
not change the inherent relationship between tax changes and human behavior.
It is important to note that the premise being investigated is not only whether there
is a direct relationship between increases in gaming taxes and player behavior but
whether there exists an indirect correlation. Both scenarios are possible in the case of
the lllinois tax rate increase. Attendance fees were increased and directly paid by the
players during the period examined in this research so some effects of the tax increase
were directly transferred to the customer. However, the full implication of the changes in
gaming taxes is more complex and indirect in nature. Changes in gaming tax rates may
cause commercial casino operators to behave differently. For example, if operators are
presented with a tax scenario that encourages the limitation of adjusted gross revenues in
order to avoid reaching levels that invoke the payment of higher gaming tax rates, then
these operators may act to limit revenues by means such as scaling back promotions,
changes in operation hours, and changing preferred customer policies. These operator
changes have the potential to result in changes in player behavior or demand.
Gaming research focusing on deregulation repercussions and general gaming
forecasting is also discussed. These particular examples not only inform the
understanding of likely effects of inherent changes to taxation rates but also provide
insight into various suitably applicable methodologies that could provide valuable
analysis into the Illinois gaming tax restructuring.
Occupancy Taxes
Hiemstra and Ismail ( 1992) examine the enactment of occupancy taxes by
municipalities. They assert that legislators erroneously choose these means of generating
revenues because occupancy taxes primarily affect travelers who are non-constituents.
However, the researchers show by analyzing the elasticity of demand (occupancy) that
UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal+ Volume 13 Issue 2
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changes in occupancy tax rates resulted in an impact on occupancy rates. A 9.8% room
tax resulted in a 3% drop in occupancy (Hiemstra & Ismail, 1992; Hiemstra & Ismail,
1993). The aforementioned scenario mirrors the allegations of gaming's stakeholders who
suggest that legislators view commercial gaming as a bottomless source of income which
is impermeable to classic economic pressures (Christiansen, 2005).
1986 Tax Reform Act
The 1986 Tax Reform Act was the most significant adaptation of the tax code since
its formation in the 1950's. When the tax reform was analyzed, real estate, in particular,
proved to occupy the mantle of most affected industries. The primary aspect of real estate
investment impacted was depreciation scheduling; in addition, flow-through tax losses
were reduced, and loss offset limitations were instituted (Sanger, Sirmans, & Turnbull,
1990).
Sanger (1990) utilizes intervention analysis (defined as an intervention in a time
series) because an event, in this case the tax reform, represents a change in the stochastic
process. The dependent variable in this study is the security returns of Real Estate
Investment Trusts, known as REITS. These entities invest in real estate and real estate
related assets with the purpose of generating a return for their investors (US Securities
& Exchange Commission. 2004). Sanger employs dummy variables to model the tax
intervention as well as account for seasonal effects. The study's results indicate that the
market assesses the changes in the tax code to the disadvantage of real estate owners
(Sanger et al., 1990).
Another study that seeks to understand the effects of the 1986 Tax Reform Act is
undertaken by Smith and Woodward (1996). The researchers seek to evaluate the effects
of the above mentioned tax reform on the value of apartments. Utilizing a time-series
cross-sectional panel data design to examine their data, the researchers find that a couple
of obstacles threaten the validity of their results. The degree of overbuilding needed to
be controlled for in the examined regions. In addition, because of the nature of timeseries analysis, the authors acknowledge the potential for autocorrelation. Tests prove
autocorrelation is a factor and the researchers rely on the Parks method of analysis to
address the issue.
Applying a dummy variable to represent the tax changes and controlling for the
degree of overbuilding, the researchers conclude the 1986 Tax Reform Act had a
statistically significant negative effect on apartment values (Smith & Woodward, 1996).
These studies both inform the methodological approach adopted in this research into the
Illinois gaming tax change as well as provide support to the implication that changes to
taxation law translate into changes in human behavior.
Gaming Forecasting
A general overview of gaming research assessing regulation and tax changes is
included to provide a more comprehensive understanding of gaming taxes, regulation
changes, and gaming proliferation in the Midwest, United States.
Deregulation
A number of researchers have addressed how deregulation has affected gaming
volume. Methodologically, these examinations of deregulation are often similar as well
as pertinent to understanding how to approach a tax increase. Although the effect of
deregulation and a tax increase might be opposed, they both share a main characteristic.
In both events a single inflection point is introduced in the analysis of a time series
(Eisendrath, 2005). In the Midwestern commercial gaming market, these acts of
deregulation have often been tied to increases in gaming tax rates.
Deregulation in Atlantic City
Nichols' (1998) study looks at the 1991 deregulation of Atlantic City commercial
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gaming, the researcher chooses a Box Jenkins autoregressive moving average or
ARIMA model to conduct his analysis. Nichols measures the effect of an increase in
operating hours and slot machine space on gaming win. The study acknowledges an
inherent shortcoming of operationalizing the demand or volume variable as casino win.
Casino win, also known as gambler's losses, is equal to gross gaming revenue. Gross
gaming revenue is problematic as a measure because it includes money that is originally
distributed by the casino in complimentary fashion ("comps"); therefore, the casino
is winning back its own cash. Nichols quantifies the comp ratio as 8.5% of total win.
Nichols supports his choice of gaming win because, unlike EBITDA and general revenue
related data for example, win does not include non-gaming revenues which distort the
results (Nichols, 1998b). EBITDA basically describes net income with interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortization added back in. The EBITDA measure allows interested
parties to compare companies and industries while excluding accounting individual
financing and accounting decisions. However EBITDA is not a GAAP (General Accepted
Accounting Principles) approved measure so companies have the choice to change the
components of their calculation from one time period to the next (Investopedia, 2008).
Prior to Nichols' research, Shonkwiler (1993) relies on a structural time series model
to evaluate the impact of Atlantic City commercial casinos on gaming volume in Nevada.
This study addresses the impact of an extraneous event on time series data. Shonkwiler
supports his methodological choice by promoting the value of structural time series
for the modeling of linear (stochastic) trends and seasonality. Shonkwiler's research
concludes that the introduction of Atlantic City casinos reduced Nevada gaming revenues
by between 10 and 12 percent (Shonkwiler, 1993).
Deregulation of Midwestern Riverboats
Nichols (1998a) also addresses deregulation of the United States Midwestern
riverboat market the same year he produced his study on Atlantic City. In a response
to the 1994 Illinois' introduction of less regulated riverboat gambling, Iowa revamped
their 1991 strict inaugural regulations and eliminated mandated sailing, loss limits and
space restrictions. Choosing casino win, total admissions and win per admission as the
dependent variables, Nichols uses regression analysis to control for the effect of day
of the week, seasonality, location, and per capita income while attempting to evaluate
the impact of deregulation. Nichols' results indicate that deregulation is an impetus
to significant cross-border substitution as well having increased the three dependent
variables: win, win per admission, and admission (Nichols, 1998). Nichols' work
with Iowa and Illinois riverboat deregulation has obvious similarities to this study's
investigation into the impact of gaming taxation in Illinois.
Econometric models to determine demand
Thalheimer and Ali (2003) develop an econometric model to identify determinates of
demand, particularly slot demand, for 24 Midwestern riverboats and racetracks/casinos.
The researchers examine the effects of "traditional demand" variables as well as location
and government restrictions. Thalheimer and Ali identify variables such as betting limits,
access, win, and number of tables in an effort to explain changes in slot volume. Slot
volume is divided by the market area population surrounding the riverboat or casino in
an effort to control for the population effect. The model shows an extremely impressive
degree of explanatory power (R squared =0.937) thus concluding that population and its
access to facility is positively related to slot demand while access to competing facilities
has a negative impact. Lastly the model demonstrates that restrictive limits on gaming are
also negatively related to slot demand (Thalheimer & Ali, 2003). Despite the similarities,
it is noteworthy to point out that the Thalheimer and Ali (2003) research examines the
impact of the independent variable such as access and limits at the single property level
rather than gaming volume at the state level (Eisendrath, 2005).
In an effort to enhance the accuracy of Nevada's budgetary planning and with the
UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal+ Volume 13 Issue 2
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recognition of the significance that gaming taxes play in the Nevada state budget, Cargill
and Eadington (1978) endeavor to construct a means of forecasting gaming revenues. By
first assessing seasonal variations and patterns and then employing multiple regression
equations to identify statistically significant correlations, the researchers finally choose
the Box Jenkins method to provide the forecasting (Cargill & Eadington, 1978). The
earlier stages of this often cited study of gaming reflects the methodology choice of this
more narrow research into the repercussions of a single tax increase in Illinois. Like
Cargill and Eadington, this study seeks to identify whether a particular tax increase has an
effect on gaming volume. Unlike Cargill and Eadington, this study of the 2003 Illinois tax
increase does not attempt to forecast the long term effects of the restructuring primarily
because the change was not permanent.

The Illinois market
Turco and Riley (1996) look at the factors that are important to riverboat gamblers
when choosing a facility and also investigate alternate activities a gambler might consider
engaging in with their gaming budget. The researchers' concentrate their study on the
Illinois market. Loyalty as reflected by favorite place to play is shown to be an important
factor for garners when choosing gambling venues (Turco & Riley, 1996). Based on
Turco and Riley's investigation it is feasible to investigate an impact on gaming demand
from a reduction of complimentary goods and services which are dispensed to garners in
an effort to build loyalty.
Bowen ( 1994) addresses the value of relationship marketing when he points out
the connection between satisfaction and loyalty. His article describes the emergence
of slot clubs and the use of targeted promotions to develop relationships with known
players whose values are then tracked by the casino. Bowen identifies an Aurora, Illinois
riverboat as an example of a facility that tracks and rates players. After assessing a
player's worth, the casinos will choose to forgo parking revenue in exchange for what the
operator believes will be a better relationship with their customer (Bowen, 1994).
Gaming analyst Falcone predicts a reduction in complimentary play, food, and
lodging when describing the 2003 Illinois tax restructuring (Falcone, 2003b). To
understand the pressure that falls onto marketing expenditures such as costs, it is
important to understand that unlike products like tobacco and alcohol, casino operators
do not provide a product with conventional price elasticity because of their relative
difficulty in passing on increases in operator expenses to their customers. An operator
could employ unpopular measures such as tightening the hold
or par of their slot machines and thereby raise the price to play
Typically, the burden of
but this may lead to a decrease in demand. Typically, the burden
tax increases rests on
of tax increases rests on operators and is expressed through
operators and is expressed
lower rates of invested capital, decreased development projects,
reduction in employees, and in the limitation of marketing and/
through lower rates of
or complimentary expenses (Falcone, 2003a).

invested capital, decreased
development projects,
reduction in employees,
and in the limitation
of marketing and/or
complimentary expenses.

Measuring Demand
When forecasting or quantifying gaming volume,
researchers have relied on numerous variables as mentioned
throughout this review of related literature. This study will
utilize slot machine coin-in as the indicator of gaming demand
or volume. The decision to rely on coin-in is based on a number
of factors. First, all the alternative measures of gaming demand
are fundamentally problematic. The majority of operators do not
and/or cannot quantify the amount wagered on table games (Eisendrath et al., 2008). The
measure of table drop, as previously mentioned, reflects the amount converted to chips
and does not represent the amount wagered. Revenue figures can vary with short-term
luck and volatility on both the player and casino's part (Kilby et al., 2004). Therefore,
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coin-in reflects the most accurate and least contaminated measure of gaming volume
(Eisendrath et al., 2008; Lucas, Dunn, & Kharitonova, 2006).
The second reason this research relies on coin-in to represent gaming demand is
the predominance of the coin-in contribution to the overall commercial casino revenue
sources. Those who have researched the Las Vegas, Nevada, market have chosen coin-in
as the preferential proxy for gaming demand and justified the decision partially due to
the important contribution coin-in makes towards overall revenues. Slot win accounts
for approximately 50 percent of gaming win in the Las Vegas market (Eisendrath et al.,
2008). In contrast, slot machines or electronic gaming devices (EGDs) account for nearly
90 percent of Illinois adjusted gaming revenues (Illinois Gaming Board, 2005).

Hypothesis, data and methodology
It is hypothesized that the restructuring of the Illinois gaming tax in 2003 will
show a negative impact on gaming demand as represented by the dependent coin-in
response variable. The term "2003 70% tax and overall tax restructuring" represents the
independent or predictor dummy variable for the tax change.
Main Hypothesis
The null hypothesis states that there is no difference in coin-in after the Illinois tax
restructuring. The null is expressed by the equation:
Ho :Coefficient of "2003 70% tax and overall tax restructuring" is equal or greater than 0.
The research hypothesis which predicts that there will be a decrease in coin-in is
expressed by the equation:
Hr : Coefficient of "2003 70% tax and overall tax restructuring" is less than 0.
Data Collection
Secondary data for this study are compiled from Illinois Gaming Board Monthly
Revenue Reports (1GB, 2000-2006), comprised of monthly commercial gaming
information from January 2000 to December 2006. These public data are available from
the Illinois Gaming Board website and via request from the same entity. Each Illinois
docksite is required by their licensure to provide this information in a timely manner
to the state office of the Illinois Gaming Board. The information is made public shortly
thereafter. As previously discussed, this research will use the independent variable coinin (Electronic Gaming Device Handle) as reported by the various docksites in Illinois
for the 84 months covered. Coin-in is reported on a monthly basis by each docksite to
Figure 1. Illinois docksite AGR comparison of table games and slot machines.

2003 Table Games vs Slot (EGO's) AGR by
Docksite
$350,000,000
$300,000,000

szso.ooo,ooo
$200,000,000
$150,000.000
$100,000,000
$50,000,000
$0

• Table Games
~EGD
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the Illinois Gaming Board. Coin-in has been chosen as the proxy for gaming demand
due to its reliability and due to the dominant contribution of
slots/EGDs to overall gaming revenue. Figure 1 illustrates a
Coin-in has been
detailed breakdown of the relative importance of Slot (EGD)
proxy for gaming
contribution to revenues based on docksite.
Figure 2 offers an overview of Illinois coin-in with added
exponential trendline. Indiana coin-in is included for the purpose
of comparison.

chosen as the
demand due
to its reliability and due to the
dominant contribution of slots/
EGDs to overall gaming revenue.

Figure 2. Comparison of Illinois and Indiana (January 2000- December 2006) coin-in
with exponential trendlines.
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Linear Regression Model
The multiple linear regression model will include a time variable testing for trend.
The time variable is assigned as follows: the first month is "1", second month "2" and so
forth. Trend is characterized as the upward or downward movement of a time series over
a period of time. When analyzing data from a particular industry, trend generally reflects
factors such as changes in total population, market growth, or long-term changes in per
capita income (Bowerman, O'Connell, & Koehler, 2005).
Seasonality or seasonal variations describe the time series flow of peaks and valleys
that are completed within a calendar year. Seasonality will be assessed by the use of
dummy variables representing the months February through December. When using
dummy variables to test monthly data for seasonality, only 11 months are represented by
variables. The twelfth month is represented by the constant term of the equation. This
model has arbitrarily left January out ofthe equation.
Based upon our interest in the effect of the 70% tax rate, we will use the following
multiple linear regression model:
Yt ~ -t J3 t rl- J3 Feb+ J3 Mar+ J3 Apr+ J3 May+ J3 June+ J3 July+ J3 .Aug+
J3.Sept + J}toOct + J}uN ov + J}nDec + J3" 70%tax + et
Yt is the Illinois state coin-in in dollars. The "t" variable represents the trend component
which as previously mentioned assesses whether there is long-term positive or negative
movement in the data over time. The months February- December are treated as seasonal
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dummy variables. For example: Feb = {1 if period t is February, 0 otherwise}. A dummy
variable is used for period that reflects the 70% tax level and the overall 2003 Illinois tax
restructuring = { 1 if period with tax hike, 0 otherwise}.
An autocorrelation function plot and a partial autocorrelation plot of the regression
residuals using Minitab 15 will be used to assess autocorrelation. If autocorrelation is
revealed, a Box Jenkins model will be constructed to counteract the problem. Finally, the
residuals will be re-plotted to ensure that the Box Jenkins model solves the issue.
Results
The assumption of this model is that error terms are independent and normally
distributed with mean 0 and a common unknown variance sigma squared. With hospitality
and gaming data this assumption of independence is often violated. In time series
regression residuals are tested for autocorrelation. We conducted tests for autocorrelation
and found that it was present in the first model. We also examined the data for trend and
found no positive or negative trend over time in the data.
After examining the sample autocorrelation function (SAC) and the partial
autocorrelation function (PACF), the spikes suggest the influence of autocorrelation in
the error term of the first lag (1 month). An ARIMA or Box Jenkins model is adopted to
resolve the issue of autocorrelation. Box Jenkins methodology can be used to provide a
systematic approach to identifying an appropriate model for a time series. This technique
can be used to forecast any type of time series. In addition. the Box Jenkins methodology
can be used in conjunction with a dummy variable based time series regression in order
to counteract correlated error terms (Bowerman et al., 2005). This research utilizes
Box Jenkins methodology in the latter manner. Based on the spike at lag one of the
autocorrelation chart, a non seasonal (0, 0, 1) ARIMA model was used. This model
includes a lagged forecast error. The regression results are shown in Table 4 below.
Table 4. Regression results for regressing independent variables on Illinois coin-in (coinin is termed "EGD handle on the Illinois conunission website).
Variable
Coefficient
Tvalue
P-values
Constant
1.95£
205.5***
0.000
7.21 ***
March
1.74£
0.000
April
1.00£
4.15***
0.000
1.29£
5.35***
May
0.000
1.58£
6.53***
July
0.000
August
.757£
3.13**
0.002
-9.52***
-1.36£
0.000
70% Tax Rate
**Significant at alpha= .05; ***Significant at alpha= .01.

VIF

-1.05
1.05
1.05
1.06
1.05
1.01

Adjusted r-squared: 68.8%
Overall F Statistic: 31.49***

A number of the dummy variables representing the months proved to be statistically
insignificant when measured at the .05 significance threshold. For example, the February
dummy variable was eliminated based on the inability to reject Ho = 0 (p=.899). Based
on the same standard; June, September, October, November, and December were all
discarded from the regression equation.
All coefficients were found to be significant at the .05 level, thus rejecting all null
hypotheses. Most significantly, the variable representing the Illinois 2003 70% tax and
overall tax restructuring was found to be a statistically significant (p = .000) factor on
gaming demand as represented by statewide coin-in. Variance inflation factors (VIF),
which indicate potential multicollinearity, were also calculated. The results all show a VIF
under 2, which is considered acceptable and indicates that multicollinearity is not an Issue
with the model.
UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal+ Volume 13 Issue 2
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The final regression equation is now modified to reflect the Box Jenkins.
Illinois coin-in= 1.95E+09 + 1.74E+08 DMar + l.OOE+08 DApr + 1.29E+08 DMay
+ 1.58E+08 DJul + 75702571 DAug- 1.36E+08 70% + et
Where et =at+.2264at-1 where at-1 ~ N(O,cr 2 )
The notations in the final regression equation reflect the following. "E" is a scientific
notation for an exponential. In the above example: 1.95E+09 is the same as 1.95 billion.
The "e" in the equation represents the error term for the regression equation. The "a"
signifies the error term from the Box Jenkins treatment.

Discussion of results
The regression model confirms that the 2003 Illinois Tax Restructuring had a
negative effect on gaming demand. Trend was not a component in the final model.
Previous tax increases, increased competition with surrounding states, and the increase in
price for the final Illinois docksite license which hindered the sale of the last license all
contribute to explain the overall lack of change in coin-in trend. The months of March,
April, May, July, and August were all significant positive seasonal components in the
final regression model. It should be remembered that Illinois is a Midwestern state where
weather plays a factor in most activities. This may explain why the spring and summer
months reveal a positive influence on gaming demand. It is conceivable that June does
not reflect this increase since it is associated with the end of the school year and families
might vacation around non-gaming activities.
Conclusions and recommendation for future research
By examining the relationship between the 2003 Illinois tax restructuring and coinin, this research indicates that increases in gaming taxation had a significant negative
effect on Illinois gaming demand. The results of the study support the findings of
research on occupancy taxes, real estate taxation, and sin taxes that have consistently
found a negative correlation between demand and increased taxation and restrictions.
Specifically, this study supports the research hypothesis predicting that increased gaming
taxes will have a negative impact on gaming demand.
Despite frequent editorial supposition estimating the impact
of increases in gaming taxes on the commercial gaming industry, This research indicates that
there exists no prior empirical study examining this issue to the
increases in gaming taxation had
knowledge of this researcher. Previous research has addressed
a significant negative effect on
changes in commercial gaming restrictions with similar results.
Commercial gaming's stakeholders have frequently warned of
Illinois gaming demand.
the economic penalties that result from inflated gaming taxation
but have been unable to reference academically rigorous
research supporting or refuting their position.
The implication of this study is that casino operators should promote the similarity
between the gaming industry and the rest of the economy. Along with this investigation
of the 2003 Illinois gaming tax rate increase, casinos can identify multiple academic
studies cited within that indicate casinos are subject to the same economic forces as other
industries. Casinos do not appear to be immune from regulation or increased taxation.
The findings of this research must be considered with regard to its inherent
limitations. The external validity of these results is somewhat limited given that this
research only analyzes a single tax increase in a single Midwestern state. The usage
of coin-in, while ostensibly the best measure of gaming demand, does not constitute
the entire revenue equation. Therefore, understanding the table game contribution to
revenue will strengthen the understanding of the correlation between gaming taxation
and gaming demand. In addition this study tests the impact of a single 70% tax rate in
one Midwestern riverboat state. The results should therefore, without further research to
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corroborate these findings, not be generalized. Further research into understanding what
level of gaming taxation rates result in a significant negative impact on gaming demand
and hence revenues would be beneficial.
Although slot revenue comprises the greatest proportion of Illinois total gaming
revenue, table play nevertheless fulfills an important function in the overall revenue mix.
In addition, it is unclear whether table players are more or less impacted by expense
alterations in conjunction to tax changes. Therefore understanding this market segment
is critical and slot demand should not be assumed to reflect generalized gaming demand
which includes table games. Future research into this topic could prove fruitful. The
ability to measure table game play should improve as casino based table game systems
become more efficient and more widely adopted.
Much speculation has been cast upon the adjustments managers of commercial
gaming operations invoke when pressured by increased gaming taxes. Future research
attempting to uncover whether and to what degree marketing expenditures, capital
improvement, and employee retention/hiring rates are curtailed would be useful.
Further analysis of the impact of other states gaming tax changes and the effect on
gaming demand would contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the relationship
between gaming taxes and gaming demand. It is conceivable that other Midwestern states
with limited gaming licenses are either more or less tolerant to gaming tax increases than
less restricted states such as Nevada or Mississippi. In addition, research designed to
understand how gaming tax restructuring affects gaming demand in neighboring states
might serve to illuminate the interstate balance among commercial gaming states. If
gaming-related tax increases move gaming demand and tax receipts from the legislator's
own state to their neighbor, state governments may become increasingly cautionary
before making drastic changes.
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